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### 1NC — T — USFG

#### Topical affirmatives must instrumentally defend an expansion of the scope of the United States’ core antitrust laws to substantially increase prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices.

#### Resolved means a policy

Louisiana House 5

(<http://house.louisiana.gov/house-glossary.htm>)

Resolution A legislative instrument that generally is used for making declarations, stating policies, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution uses the term "resolved". Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4)

#### Federal government is the legislative, executive and judicial

US Legal No Date (United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/)

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

#### Should requires action

AHD 2k

(American Heritage Dictionary 2000 (Dictionary.com))

should. The will to do something or have something take place: I shall go out if I feel like it.

#### ‘Its’ means cooperation must be governmental

US District Court 7 (United States District Court for the District of the Virgin Islands, Division of St. Thomas and St. John, “AGF Marine Aviation & Transp. v. Cassin,” *2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90808*, Lexis)

The Court inadvertently used the word "his" when the Court intended to use the word "its." The possessive pronoun was intended to refer to the party preceding its use--AGF. Indeed, that reference is consistent with the undisputed facts in this case, which indicate that Cassin completed an application for the insurance policy and submitted it to his agent, Theodore Tunick & Company ("Tunick"). Tunick, in turn, submitted the application to AGF's underwriting agent, TL Dallas. (See Pl.'s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 5.)

#### The “core” antitrust statutes are the Sherman Act, Clayton Act, and FTC Act

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U.S. antitrust law is defined by federal and state statutes, as interpreted by the courts. The core federal statutes are the Sherman Act,1 passed by Congress in 1890, and the Federal Trade Commission2 and Clayton Acts,3 both passed in 1914. The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) (together the “agencies”) share enforcement of most areas of federal antitrust law but with some differences in the scope of their authority. The FTC has sole authority to enforce Section 5 of FTC Act, which prohibits (1) unfair methods of competition and (2) unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The FTC almost always pursues claims for anticompetitive conduct as unfair methods of competition and reserves charges of unfair or deceptive acts or practices for consumer protection violations. Though the FTC's authority to challenge unfair methods of competition goes beyond conduct prohibited by the Sherman and Clayton Acts, in practice the FTC brings most unfair methods of competition cases under the same standards that courts apply to Sherman Act claims. The most prominent exception is the invitation to collude offense, which falls outside the scope of the Sherman Act (if the invitation is not accepted, there is no agreement). The FTC challenges invitations to collude as so-called “standalone” violations of Section 5.4 The DOJ has sole authority to pursue criminal violations of the antitrust laws. Most states have their own state antitrust and unfair competition statutes. State law follows federal law to some extent, though as discussed below, may differ from federal law in meaningful ways that vary state to state. State attorneys general and private parties can also typically file suit to enforce both federal and state antitrust law.

#### They violate because each of the above words require governmental action

#### Vote negative — 3 impacts —

#### 1 — Fairness — forced winner-loser nature means debate is a game — the aff has a strategic incentive to stray from the resolution — that makes research impossible, discourages argumentative innovation, and turns accessibility — accesses the terminal impact to the activity.

#### 2 — Clash — they incentivise defense of unanswerable positions and monopolization of moral high ground — denies a role for the neg and transforms debate into a lecture — that destroys rigorous testing, advocacy, and research skills — turns their advocacy and precludes every intrinsic benefit to debate.

#### Clash turns case — Debate fosters anti-neoliberal ideologies — the content is irrelevant, it’s about repeatedly practicing the form of switch-side skepticism

Hahn, 16—Ph. D. in Communication from the University of Pittsburgh (Taylor, “TEACHING WHAT MATTERS: A RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTS ON LIBERAL ARTS EDUCATION AT THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS-AUSTIN,” <http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/30348/1/T.%20Hahn%20Dissertation%20-%20ETD%20submission.pdf>, dml)

Though difficult, fostering the skills necessary for students to critically analyze and deliberate on issues they find important requires educators to increase their focus on these goals. Realizing these changes would require a substantial review of how curriculum is developed and what learning outcomes are prioritized in current systems of higher education. Despite the difficulty of achieving such a goal, I believe an argument-laden curriculum to be valuable enough to warrant the extensive effort necessary for meaningful reform. Focusing higher education on the promotion of argument and deliberation within all contexts of our student’s lives is a major step toward questioning existing social trends. For example, while the argument-laden curricula I propose would not explicitly focus on neoliberalism in academia, promoting heightened levels of deliberation in the classroom can result in an organic emergence of student-led inquiry on the economic and monetary paradigms within higher education.25 Put otherwise, the simple act of facilitating deliberation in the classroom, regardless of the issues being discussed, can prompt healthy skepticism which is readily translatable to other issues and contexts.26 Brownyn Davies shows that an education focused on critical thinking can be an emancipatory method of questioning neoliberalism. We must give to our students a doubled gaze, to enable them to become critically literate, to become citizens at once capable of adapting and becoming appropriate within the contexts in which they find themselves and as responsible citizens capable of critique; citizens who can understand the constitutive work that discourse does and who can work creatively, imaginatively, politically, and with passion to break open the old where it is faulty and to envisage the new. Even more urgent is the task of giving them some personal tools for withstanding the worst effects of neoliberalism, for seeing both the pleasure and the danger of being drawn into it, for understanding the ways in which they are subjected by it. They need to be able to generate stable narratives of identity and to understand the way neoliberal discourses and practices will work against that stability.27 Application of Davies’ doubled gaze has the potential to radically change pedagogical approaches. Throughout academia, scholars have pointed to the ways that training students to interrogate social structures can radically alter neoliberalist systems of power.28 By this, I mean that utilizing and examining various forms of critical inquiry within the classroom produces the potential for students to question neoliberalism in multiple aspects of American society.29 By teaching students how to deliberate, colleges and universities can train students to appreciate and expect a healthy level of skepticism toward the existing norms of knowledge production grounded in canonical truth and neoliberalism. These current norms, outlined in chapter five, have resulted in existing systems of higher education that skirt argument and civic deliberation in favor of a myopic focus toward economic goals and absolute certainty of one’s position. The goal of my proposed reform is to educate students in argument and deliberation skillsets, thus rejuvenating liberal arts education and checking neoliberal ideologies in academia. Are these changes possible? There are some positive signs that argument and deliberation skills offer a potential means of slowly reforming both academia and society at large. Any successful attempt at progressive social change requires a slow, incremental, even molecular, struggle to break down the prevailing hegemony and construct an alternative counter-hegemony to take its place. Organic intellectuals have a crucial role to play in this process by helping to undermine the “natural,” “commonsense,” internalized nature of the status quo. This in turn helps create political space within which alternative conceptions of politics can be developed.30

#### Movements have sufficient energy now, the only question is harnessing that energy into political success through targeted demands and policy expertise.

Archer ‘18 (Deborah N., Associate Professor of Clinical Law @ NYU School of Law, “POLITICAL LAWYERING FOR THE 21ST CENTURY,” draft, pp. 1-43)

Modern political justice lawyering must also include strategies to support and harness the “disruptive power”140 of widespread youth-led movements, collective action, and protest. Many justice movements seek to harness disruption or provoke unrest to redistribute power or force reforms.141 While disruption through protest has been essential in bringing light and voice to modern social justice issues such as police brutality (through, for example, the Black Lives Matter movement) and economic inequality (through, for example, Occupy Wall Street), protests standing alone may not be enough to lead to structural reform or transformational change. Without a viable replacement to fill the void left by a disrupted system, a clear demand for meaningful change, and a plan for implementing that change, the disruptive power may never translate to justice.

Finally, modern political justice lawyers must be able to integrate both positive and negative conceptions of equality into their advocacy. Many modern social justice problems are difficult or impossible to fully resolve through court orders.142 Moreover, courts have shown a growing reluctance to issue sweeping injunctive relief that leaves school systems or police departments under the management of courts or court-appointed special masters.143 While utilizing courts to prohibit or limit actions that infringe on individual rights, advocates should be able to articulate a positive vision of what stakeholders can or should do to better promote, protect, and respect those rights. In the context of police reform, for example, victory may take the form of a judicial finding that a police officer used excessive force or an award of money damages. However, even the broadest injunctive relief may struggle to translate into systemic reform—a positive conception of just and effective policing.

B. Expanding the Lawyer’s Toolbox

In order to effect systemic change, lawyers need to understand what levers are available to achieve that change, and when, where, and how to pull each lever. Political justice lawyers must be skilled at integrated advocacy, using individual and strategic litigation to establish and protect rights, traditional and social media engagement to shape and promote the narrative, community organizing to mobilize effected communities and their allies, and interdisciplinary collaborations to bring the work of other disciplines to bear on creating policies and practices to replace illegal and repressive practices. An effective political justice lawyer has many tools in her toolbox, and knows when and how to use each one. In addition to these tools, political lawyers must learn to break systemic problems into their smaller components; identify advocacy alternatives and evaluate the costs and benefits of each approach; and resolve instances in which an attorney’s own social justice values and vision collide.

1. Breaking Apart Systemic Issues

Political justice lawyers must be able to break apart a systemic problem into manageable components. The complexity of social problems, can cause law students, and even experienced political lawyers, to become overwhelmed. In describing his work challenging United States military and economic interventions abroad, civil rights advocate and law professor Jules Lobel wrote of this process: “Our foreign-policy litigation became a sort of Sisyphean quest as we maneuvered through a hazy maze cluttered with gates. Each gate we unlocked led to yet another that blocked our path, with the elusive goal of judicial relief always shrouded in the twilight mist of the never-ending maze.”144

Pulling apart a larger, systemic problem into its smaller components can help elucidate options for advocacy. An instructive example is the use of excessive force by police officers against people of color. Every week seems to bring a new video featuring graphic police violence against Black men and women. Law students are frequently outraged by these incidents. But the sheer frequency of these videos and lack of repercussions for perpetrators overwhelm those students just as often. What can be done about a problem so big and so pervasive?

To move toward justice, advocates must be able to break apart the forces that came together to lead to that moment: intentional discrimination, implicit bias, ineffective training, racial segregation, lack of economic opportunity, the over-policing of minority communities, and the failure to invest in non-criminal justice interventions that adequately respond to homelessness, mental illness, and drug addiction. None of these component problems are easily addressed, but breaking them apart is more manageable—and more realistic—than acting as though there is a single lever that will solve the problem. After identifying the component problems, advocates can select one and repeat the process of breaking down that problem until they get to a point of entry for their advocacy.

2. Identifying Advocacy Alternatives

As discussed earlier, political justice lawyering embraces litigation, community organizing, interdisciplinary collaboration, legislative reform, public education, direct action, and other forms of advocacy to achieve social change. After parsing the underlying issues, lawyers need to identify what a lawyer can and should do on behalf of impacted communities and individuals, and this includes determining the most effective advocacy approach. Advocates must also strategize about what can be achieved in the short term versus the long term. The fight for justice is a marathon, not a sprint. Many law students experience frustration with advocacy because they expect immediate justice now. They have read the opinion in Brown v. Board of Education, but forget that the decision was the result of a decades-long advocacy strategy.145 Indeed, the decision itself was no magic wand, as the country continues to work to give full effect to the decision 70 years hence.

Advocates cannot only fight for change they will see in their lifetime, they must also fight for the future.146 Change did not happen over night in Brown and lasting change cannot happen over night today. Small victories can be building blocks for systemic reform, and advocates must learn to see the benefit of short-term responsiveness as a component of long-term advocacy.

Many lawyers subscribe to the American culture of success, with its uncompromising focus on immediate accomplishments and victories.147 However, those interested in social justice must adjust their expectations. Many pivotal civil rights victories were made possible by the seemingly hopeless cases that were brought, and lost, before them.148 In the fight for justice, “success inheres in the creation of a tradition, of a commitment to struggle, of a narrative of resistance that can inspire others similarly to resist.”149 Again, Professor Lobel’s words are instructive: “the current commitment of civil rights groups, women’s groups, and gay and lesbian groups to a legal discourse to legal activism to protect their rights stems in part from the willingness of activists in political and social movements in the nineteenth century to fight for rights, even when they realized the courts would be unsympathetic.”150 Professor Lobel also wrote about Helmuth James Von Moltke, who served as legal advisor to the German Armed Services until he was executed in 1945 by Nazis: “In battle after losing legal battle to protect the rights of Poles, to save Jews, and to oppose German troops’ war crimes, he made it clear that he struggled not just to win in the moment but to build a future.”151

3. Creating a Hierarchy of Values

Advocates challenging complex social justice problems can find it difficult to identify the correct solution when one of their social justice values is in conflict with another. A simple example: a social justice lawyer’s demands for swift justice for the victim of police brutality may conflict with the lawyer’s belief in the officer’s fundamental right to due process and a fair trial. While social justice lawyers regularly face these dilemmas, law students are not often forced to struggle through them to resolution in real world scenarios—to make difficult decisions and manage the fallout from the choices they make in resolving the conflict. Engaging in complex cases can force students to work through conflicts, helping them to articulate and sharpen their beliefs and goals, forcing them to clearly define what justice means broadly and in the specific context presented.

#### 3 — Topic Education — policy debates over antitrust are valuable

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IV. Antitrust in Civil Society

Competition issues are also part of the general civic discourse separate from the campaign rhetoric and legislative proposals offered by politicians. This is also a significant sign that antitrust has begun to be an important source of small “p” politics that engages substantial segments of the public at large. One example is the increased number of non-technical books intended for a lay audience that deal with the role of antitrust in a healthy economy and democracy. Recent and forthcoming books dealing with these themes include Tim Wu’s “The Curse of Bigness,”109 Matt Stoller’s “Goliath,”110 Maurice Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi’s “Competition Overdose,”111 Zephyr Teachout’s “Break ‘em Up,”112 and David Dayan’s “Monopolized.”113 On the academic side, there are a plethora of government and NGO studies of competition policy on digital competition114 and new works are flourishing which explore the broader ramifications of antitrust and competition in society.115 Long form and more mass-market journalism have also taken up the mantle of exploring the role of antitrust and competition policy. Such diverse magazines as The Atlantic,116 Time, 117 New Republic,118 American Prospect,119 Rolling Stone,120 New York Times magazine,121 Variety,122 National Review, 123 Foreign Policy,124 and other policy and opinion magazines have all run recent stories or profiles of individuals involved in antitrust issues. Before the COVID-19 pandemic effectively monopolized press coverage in the United States, there were thirty-three antitrust related stories on the front page of the New York Times or the front page of its business section over a three-month period in late 2019. 125 A majority of the stories focused on tech giants such as Apple, Microsoft, Google, Amazon, and Facebook.126 In addition, the New York Times also covered stories about mergers, merger policy, local issues such as the Chicago taxi market, and various smaller industries.127 This is separate from coverage during the same period of campaign issues and candidate statements relating to the field. A similar increase in coverage during this same period can be observed anecdotally in more business-oriented publications like Forbes, Barron’s, Wired, and the Wall Street Journal; general newspapers like USA Today, Washington Post, and Huffington Post; more local newspapers; as well as radio and television.128 Web pages and social media accounts on these issues have similarly proliferated on all ideological perspectives.129 Lobbying and public policy groups are growing in number and influence. Beyond the traditional trade associations and general think tanks there are now a number of active groups with antitrust as a large part of their focus. These include the Open Markets Institute, 130 American Antitrust Institute, 131 Anti-Monopoly Fund,132 Institute for Self-Reliance,133 Public Citizen,134 Public Knowledge,135 Demos, 136 and the International Center for Law and Economics.137 At the more technical legal end of the debate, antitrust is similarly flourishing as a field. One sees increased law school hiring in the field for the first time in decades. Academic institutes and centers abound with a wide variety of perspectives ranging from libertarian to enforcement oriented.138 Most major antitrust cases now feature multiple amicus briefs from legal and economic experts on both sides of an issue both in the Supreme Court or the Courts of Appeals.139

Conclusion

Antitrust has always been political in nature. Antitrust law provides broad legal commands dealing with how governments and private individuals can challenge different types of market behavior. In this way, antitrust has not changed. Antitrust will never take the place of sports, the Dow Jones index, or the weather for conversation at the breakfast table, but it has become a meaningful part of the political and policy debate for candidates, the legislature, and important segments of civil society. What has changed, however, is the degree that antitrust has reentered the political arena. Once mostly the domain of technocrats, antitrust issues have been proposed and debated by Presidential candidates, political parties, legislators, pundits, journalists, lobby groups, and voters alike. There are also a flurry of serious proposals and investigations that would make significant changes to the current system if adopted. This is all to the good. Even if none of the current proposals come to fruition, the antitrust debate is part of a broader engagement with political economy issues dealing with fundamental concerns such as economic concentration, globalization, income inequality, social and racial justice, and even recently the proper response to the COVID-19 emergency. The many proposals, initiatives, and pressure groups represent at a minimum the return of antitrust as part of the progressive agenda.

#### Switch side debate solves their offense — it’s the greatest internal link to advocacy skills and the most reflexive version of the topic.

#### The topical version of the aff replaces the consumer welfare standard with a worker welfare standard. Possible planks to this aff are inserted in the doc.

The United States federal government should substantially increase prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices by:

* holding all vertical restraints in presumptive violation of the Sherman Act;
* establishing a strict standard for exclusionary conduct and horizontal and vertical mergers based on market indicators;
* expanding the scope of its antitrust laws to encompass labor monopsony;
* incorporating a labor market impact assessment in its statutory merger review process;
* holding no-poaching clauses in franchising contracts and non-compete clauses in employment contracts illegal per se.

#### The aff would have advantages about accommodating labor, policing capital, and inspiring worker organization.

Vaheesan 19, \*Sandeep Vaheesan is a legal director at the Open Markets Institute, previously served as a regulations counsel at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau; (2019, “Accommodating Capital and Policing Labor: Antitrust in the Two Gilded Ages”, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5e449c8c3ef68d752f3e70dc/t/5eac7ae9e7384923a4b1373d/1588361971964/Accommodating-Capital-and-Policing-Labor.pdf)

IV. HOW REMAKING ANTITRUST LAW COULD HELP END THE NEW GILDED AGE

Congress, the antitrust agencies, and federal courts should restore the original anti-monopoly, pro-worker vision for the antitrust laws. For much of their history, these laws had a pro-capital, anti-worker orientation. Not-withstanding this record, these laws can be reoriented to police capital and accommodate labor in accord with the intent of Congress. In passing these laws, Congress aimed to curtail the power of capital and also preserve space for workers to organize.392 The antitrust agencies and federal courts should reject the ahistorical and deficient efficiency paradigm and embrace the political economy framework of the sponsors of the antitrust laws. Specifically, they need to reinterpret antitrust to restore competitive market structures and limit the power of large businesses over consumers, producers, rivals, and citizens. Along with imposing checks on the power of large businesses, Congress, the agencies, and the courts must preserve freedom of action for workers acting in concert.

New statutes and executive and judicial reinterpretation of antitrust law, in accord with congressional intent, would help remedy many economic and political injustices in the United States today. Monopoly and oligopoly appear to contribute to a host of societal ills. These include increased inequality,393 diminished income for workers394 and other producers,395 and declining business formation.396 At the same time, protecting workers’ collective action against antitrust challenges would create more space for workers to organize and claim a fairer share of income and wealth.397 Restoring antitrust law to its original goals would likely produce a more just and equitable society. Although no means a panacea for what ails the United States, antitrust law should be part of a broader social democratic agenda that reduces the yawning inequalities in wealth and power today.398

#### Reducing barriers to class organizing through anti-monopoly laws strengthens trade unionism and rekindles New Deal-era labor movements.

[Callaci](https://forgeorganizing.org/author/brian-callaci) 21, the Chief Economist at the Open Markets Institute. He previously worked at UNITE HERE, Workers United, and Change to Win, and served on the Joint Council of United Auto Workers Local 2322, (Brian, April 13th, 2021, “It’s Time for Labor to Embrace Antimonopoly”, https://forgeorganizing.org/article/its-time-labor-embrace-antimonopoly)

The policies advocated by each movement today are complementary as well. Bruenig is right that the worst employers are often small, undercapitalized sweatshops. But the answer to this problem doesn’t lie in monopolies. Passing a $15 minimum wage and reforming the National Labor Relations Act to make it drastically easier to unionize would make it much more difficult for inefficient businesses — big or small — to utilize low wages as a competitive strategy. High wages and unions would penalize companies below minimum efficient scale but without encouraging them to amass more dangerous amounts of power. Meanwhile, antitrust policy can protect small suppliers from monopsonistic predation by massive buyers like Walmart or Amazon, allowing them to raise wages for their own workers. Antitrust can perform a similar function for [franchisees](https://equitablegrowth.org/new-research-shows-the-franchise-business-model-in-the-united-states-harms-workers-and-franchisees/) dominated by powerful fast-food brands. As antitrust advocate Zephyr Teachout puts it, “we should make it easier to organize people, and harder to organize capital.” We need both movements as part of a progressive coalition if we are to democratize our economy and protect it from corporate power.

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#### The aff’s opposition to governmentality makes solvency impossible. Affirmation produces catharsis, but cements inequality---The alternative is rejection---it’s key

Smulewicz-Zucker 15 – Professor of Philosophy @ Baruch College CUNY

(Gregory, “The Treason of Intellectual Radicalism and the Collapse of Leftist Politics,” LOGOS, Winter edition)

Radical politics in contemporary western democracies finds itself in a state of crisis. When viewed from the vantage point of social change, a progressive transformation of the social order, political radicalism is found wanting. This would seem to go against the grain of perceived wisdom. As an academic enterprise, radical theory has blossomed. Figures such as Slavoj Žižek openly discuss Marxism in popular documentaries, new journals have emerged touting a radical “anti-capitalism,” and whole conferences and sub-fields are dominated by questions posed by obscure theoretical texts. Despite this, there is a profound lack in substantive, meaningful political, social, and cultural criticism of the kind that once made progressive and rational left political discourse relevant to the machinations of real politics and the broader culture. Today, leftist political theory in the academy has fallen under the spell of ideas so far removed from actual political issues that the question can be posed whether the traditions of left critique that gave intellectual support to the great movements of modernity – from the workers movement to the Civil Rights movement – possess a critical mass to sustain future struggles. Quite to the contrary, social movements have lost political momentum, they are generally focused on questions of culture, shallow discussions of class, and are generally obsessed with questions of identity divorced from the questions of material forms of oppression rather than on the great “social question” of unequal distributions of economic and political power which once served as the driving impulse for political, social and cultural transformation. As these new radical mandarins spill ink on futile debates over “desire,” “identity,” and illusory visions of anarchic democracy, economic inequality has ballooned into oligarchic proportions, working people have been increasingly marginalized, and ethnic minority groups are turned into a modern “coolie” labor force. This has been the result, we contend, of a lack of concern with real politics in contemporary radical theory. Further, we believe that this is the result of a transformation of ideas, that contemporary political theory on the left has witnessed a decisive shift in focus in recent decades – a shift that has produced nothing less than the incoherence of the tradition of progressive politics in our age. At a time when the left is struggling to redefine itself and respond to current political and economic crises, a series of trends in contemporary theory has reshaped the ways that politics is understood and practiced. Older thinkers such as Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan, and Jacques Derrida, and newer voices like Alain Badiou, Jacques Rancière, David Graeber and Judith Butler, among others, have risen to the status of academic and cultural icons while their ideas have become embedded in the “logics” of new social movements. As some aspects of the recent Occupy Wall Street demonstrations have shown, political discourse has become increasingly dominated by the impulses of neo-anarchism, identity politics, post-colonialism, and other intellectual fads. This new radicalism has made itself so irrelevant with respect to real politics that it ends up serving as a kind of cathartic space for the justifiable anxieties wrought by late capitalism, further stabilizing its systemic and integrative power rather than disrupting it. These trends are the products as well as unwitting allies of that which they oppose. The transformation of radical and progressive politics throughout the latter half of the twentieth and the early decades of the twenty-first centuries is characterized by both a sociological shift as well as an intellectual one. A core thesis has been that the shift from industrial to post-industrial society has led to the weakening of class politics. But this is unsatisfying. There is no reason why class cannot be seen in the divisions of mental and service labor as it was with an industrial proletariat. There is no reason why political power rooted in unequal property and control over resources, in the capacity for some to command and to control the labor of others as well as the consumption of others ought not to be a basic political imperative. To this end, what we would call a rational radical politics should seek not the utopian end of a “post-statist” politics, but rather to enrich common goods, erode the great divisions of wealth and class, democratize all aspects of society and economy, and seek to orient the powers of individuals and the community toward common ends. Indeed, only by widening the struggles of labor and re-thinking the ends of the labor movement – connecting the struggles labor to issues beyond the workplace, to education, the environment, public life, issues of racial and gender equality, culture and the nature of the social order more broadly – can we envision a revitalization of a worker’s movement, one that would have no need of the alienated theory of the new radicals.[1] But this is merely one fringe expression of what we see as a corrupted, simplified and de-politicized “new” radicalism. Once grounded in the Enlightenment impulse for progress, equality, rationalism, and the critical confrontation with asymmetrical power relations, the dominant trends of radical political thought now evade the concrete nature of these concerns. The battles that raged in the 1980s and 1990s between postmodernists and defenders of modernity – while serving as a harbinger of the contemporary split between the radical theorists divorced from reality and those who seek to establish anti-foundationalist conceptions of democratic discourse – were attached to a strong sense that the future of rationalism and radical politics hung in the balance. Today’s radical intellectuals do not feel compelled to defend their arguments or respond to their critics. Their purported radicalism becomes all the more opaque when the coherence of their claims is called into question. A concern for an exaggerated subjectivity, identity politics, anti-empirical theories of power, an obsession with “difference” – all serve to deplete the radical tradition of its potency. Radical intellectuals now formulate new vocabularies, invent new forms of “subjectivity,” and concoct new languages of discourse that only serve to splinter forms of political resistance, consigning radicalism to the depths of incoherence and (academic success notwithstanding) political irrelevance. Indeed, the disintegration of the great radical movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries – from the labor movement to the Civil Rights movement – has detached philosophical thinking from the mechanisms of power and political reality more broadly. The result has been – despite the ironic new turn toward “anti-philosophy” – the conquest of politics by poorly constructed philosophy. Abstraction has been the result, as well as a panoply of shibboleths that have only served to sever “radical” thought from its relevance to contemporary politics and society. It seems to us that the survival of the tradition of rational, radical political and social criticism pivots on a confrontation with these new academic trends and fads.

#### 1AC Stiegler and Amaro and Khan says computation causes hyper-synchronization but the aff is key to individuation

#### The impact is global existential crises driven by the worst excesses of neoliberal exploitation

Srnicek and Williams 15 – \*PhD in IR @ LSE, \*\*PhD student at the University of East London, presently at work on a thesis entitled Hegemony and Complexity

(Nick and Alex, “Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World Without Work,” Kindle Book)

Less politically radical than horizontalism, though no less ubiquitous, is localism. As an ideology, localism extends far beyond the left, inflecting the politics of pro-capitalists, anti-capitalists, radicals and mainstream culture alike, as a new kind of political common sense. Shared between all of these is a belief that the abstraction and sheer scale of the modern world is at the root of our present political, ecological and economic problems, and that the solution therefore lies in adopting a ‘small is beautiful’ approach to the world. 69 Small-scale actions, local economies, immediate communities, face-to-face interaction – all of these responses characterise the localist worldview. In a time when most of the political strategies and tactics developed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries appear blunted and ineffectual, localism has a seductive logic to it. In all its diverse variants, from centre-right communitarianism70 to ethical consumerism, 71 developmental microloans, and contemporary anarchist practice, 72 the promise it offers to do something concrete, enabling political action with immediately noticeable effects, is empowering on an individual level. But this sense of empowerment can be misleading. The problem with localism is that, in attempting to reduce large-scale systemic problems to the more manageable sphere of the local community, it effectively denies the systemically interconnected nature of today’s world. Problems such as global exploitation, planetary climate change, rising surplus populations, and the repeated crises of capitalism are abstract in appearance, complex in structure, and non-localised. Though they touch upon every locality, they are never fully manifested in any particular region. Fundamentally, these are systemic and abstract problems, requiring systemic and abstract responses. While much of the populist localism on the right can easily be dismissed as regressive macho fantasy (for example, secessionist libertarianism), sinister ideological cover for austerity economics (the UK Conservative Party’s ‘Big Society’) or downright racist (the nationalist or fascist blaming of immigrants for structural economic problems), the localism of the left has been less thoroughly scrutinised. Though undoubtedly well-meaning, both the radical and mainstream left partake in localist politics and economics to their detriment. In what follows we will critically examine two of the more popular variants – local food and economic localism – which in very different areas exemplify the problematic dynamics of localism in general.

#### State politics are mutable and can be progressive but the aff’s rejection crowds it out

Smulewicz-Zucker 15 – Professor of Philosophy @ Baruch College CUNY

(Gregory, “The Treason of Intellectual Radicalism and the Collapse of Leftist Politics,” LOGOS, Winter edition)

These four elements of the new radical intellectuals and the movements they have influenced are in direct contradiction to the rational radicalism that we implicitly espouse here. On our reading, there is not only a theoretical but also a deeply political difference between what these theorists search for and the Enlightenment-inspired radical view of a social order marked by solidarity around common goods, civic virtue oriented toward the defense of the public welfare, well-ordered political institutions with public purpose as their aim, constitutionalism that secures individual as well as economic rights, and the democratization of social and economic life as basic criteria for social justice. The alternative move, marked by identity politics, anti-statism, direct and participatory democracy, and neo-anarchism, has succeeded in fragmenting and marginalizing left movements and politics. Perhaps even worse, these “new movements” lack any real constituency, have scarcely any concrete political demands, and are purposefully self-alienated from the levers of real power and policy.[22] As a result, a real, politically consequential left has withered. The political culture of western democracies are marked more by a general value-consensus around liberal-capitalism than any time since the late 1950s. Movements that once saw the true mechanisms of politics – the need to influence parties, to push for legislative reform, to insist on the expansion of the democratization of economic and political institutions, to forge ideologies that were rooted in national culture – have simply disappeared. Nietzsche’s insistence that aesthetics replace the political has now become manifest in this new radicalism. Now, so-called academic “radicals” can be seen to have betrayed politics: they dismiss the reality of the political process and instead call for an obscure and abstract “resistance.” Perhaps the basic thesis can be laid out that where there is no strong labor movement, there can be no robust left politics, and even less relevant left political theory. But whatever the explanation for the increased irrationalism of current left theory, we believe that these intellectuals should be held accountable for the ideas they promulgate. Staggering is the extent to which these radical mandarins self-confidently strut their stuff, even as political defeats mount for leftist politics with the increasing victory of “right to work” legislation, the dismantling of environmental protections, the increased power of corporate interests, and an expanding wealth and income divide. We take seriously the notion that there is a responsibility for intellectuals to debate and critique ideas that have public consequence; the effect of these thinkers and their ideas on the left we see as a primary concern. As Christopher Lasch once remarked, “Cultural radicalism has become so fashionable, and so pernicious in the support it unwittingly provides for the status quo, that any criticism of contemporary society that hopes to get beneath the surface has to criticize, at the same time, much of what currently goes under the name of radicalism.”[23] With this in mind, reviving the tradition of rational progressive politics can be saved only once these new radicals and their approaches have been interrogated and critiqued. Confronting the fashionable nonsense of the present requires that these their ideas be scrutinized against the more rationalist claims that have given shape to radical and critical thought since the Enlightenment, not to mention the common sense that the thinkers we address have sought to evade. We believe that the success of these thinkers and ideas marks a real and disturbing departure from the more rationalist, more realist understanding of progressive and radical politics that marked the more successful movements of the nineteenth and much of the twentieth century. Indeed, one of the more recent fruits of this new radical theory has been the renewed interest in Marxism by so called “millennial Marxists” and their associated publications, like Jacobin, n+1, and others. They put forth no new body of theoretical arguments but seek a rediscovery of Marxism and class politics. But Even this relatively modest claim to fame cannot be further from the truth. An undeserved self-confidence and moral self-righteousness abound while concrete political analysis vanishes. To be sure, this new trend is scarecely more than a pseudo-radicalism with no real politics in view rendering its pursuits shallow and bereft of critical content. Far from opposing the trends of the culture industry and its very technique of commodifying culture and thought, their efforts are merely its expression. Radicalism now acts as a cultural tag, a new identity, at best a means to vent moral rage without genuine political acuity. In a mesmerizing sleight of hand, these new “radicals” have turned the discourse of Marxism and other figures of a past radicalism that once nourished organic labor and social movements against the realities of exploitation and human debasement into limp caricatures.

## ON

### 1NC — Presumption

#### Vote negative on presumption:

#### 1)    Conflation – they conflate scholarship with praxis --- setting the burden for aff solvency at simple introduction of “new” knowledge just devolves into infinitely regressive debates about how new is new enough and means lectures, seminars, articles, and books all solve. Failure to forward a material strategy of explosive exosomaticization means:

#### a.    There’s no mechanism to resolve their impacts

#### b.    There’s only a risk the aff is net worse than seminar discussions because they’ve introduced it in a competitive activity which necessitates negation, not dialogue

#### 2)    Unending story – it’s impossible to determine when we’ve sufficiently embraced exosomaticization and can now translate it outside debate which means we never actually resolve their impacts --– encourages affs to forward un-nuanced descriptions of the squo which

#### a.    Disincentivizes research over specific theories of power and violence and turns their model of debate

#### b.    Pacifies radical activism and context-specific education and ignoring material instances of violence in favor of broad over-arching theorizations

### 1NC — State

#### State engagement in the network can be integrated into resistance which solves better

Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing 16. Professor of Social Science @ NORD, PhD & DSc in Public Administration. Professor @ Roskilde School of Governance, PhD in Political Science. 4-6-2016. “Metagoverning Collaborative Innovation in Governance Networks.” *The American Review of Public Administration*. Vol 47. Issue 7. Sage Journals. pacc

Governance Networks as Arenas for Collaborative Policy Innovation

The myth of a dynamic and innovative private sector and an ossified and change resistant public sector is dispelled by the many spectacular examples of public innovations such as the introduction of active employment policy, recycling of garbage, one-stop shops, online education, and telemedicine. Even in the technical field, the invention of the Internet, Global Positioning System (GPS), and drones bears witness to the innovativeness of the public sector (Mazzucato, 2013). Unfortunately, public innovation tends to be episodic and accidental and thus fails to enhance the future capacity for innovation (Eggers & Singh, 2009). One way of turning public innovation into a more permanent and systematic endeavor is to institutionalize arenas where collaborative innovation can take place. A burgeoning literature points to the formation of governance networks as a way of facilitating and spurring collaboration between relevant and affected actors from the public, for-profit, and non-profit sectors (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Kickert, Klijn, & Koppenjan, 1997; Scharpf, 1994). A governance network may be defined as a horizontal institutionalization of the interaction of interdependent but operationally autonomous actors who collaborate in a shared effort to define and create public value through a process of regulated self-regulation (Sorensen & Torfing, 2007). The specific strength of governance networks compared with other institutional forms of governance, such as hierarchies and markets, is that they aim to mobilize and exploit the self-governing capacity of public and private stakeholders within boundaries defined, more often than not, by government actors. Hence, governments can share the governing responsibility with external actors who can bring new ideas, competences, and resources to the table.

Governance theorists agree, however, that governance networks are not always successful in contributing to public value production, either because they fail to include the relevant and affected actors, because the tasks and goals are too vague or ill-defined, because cultural differences or conflicts of interest prevent resource exchange, or because there is a misalignment between the strategy pursued by the network and the overall strategy of government. Research demonstrates that there is a tendency toward homophily in networks that is not conducive to the broad inclusion of relevant and affected actors (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001). Other studies shows that network collaboration is sometimes hampered by internal conflicts, low levels of trust, and an inability to communicate constructively about ends and means (Faerman, McCaffrey, & Slyke, 2001). Governance networks may also sometimes pursue dark and illegitimate agendas and strategies, or formulate skewed interpretations of public value that conceal the real pursuit of private interests (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992; Milward & Raab, 2007).

In recognition of the possibility of governance network failure, governance researchers have developed the term "metagovernance" to describe the ways in which public authorities and other central, capable, and legitimate actors can govern governance networks without reverting too much to traditional forms of command and control (Sorensen & Torfing, 2009). As such, meta-governance refers to a specific kind of second- and third-order governance that aims to improve the functioning and capacity of relatively self-governing networks to produce governance solutions that enhance the production of public value (Jessop, 2002; Kooiman, 2003; Torfing et al., 2012). The concept of "metagovernance" shares its concern for how to influence the performance of networks with the concept of "network management" that has been developed by both European (Kickert et al., 1997; Theisman, Burren, & Gerrits, 2009) and North American scholars (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Milward & Provan, 2006; Provan & Kenis, 2008). However, whereas the network management literature is primarily interested in how public managers can get things done by creating well-functioning networks, the metagovernance literature combines the focus on network management with a broader political steering perspective concerned with the question of when and how networks can contribute to interest-mediation and the achievement of overall political goals (Peters, 2010; Sorensen & Torfing, 2016).

The challenge for public metagovernors such as elected politicians, public managers, or other actors with a delegated authority is to influence the network, while recognizing that it needs a certain degree of autonomy to define its purpose and objectives, its modus operandi, and the outputs and outcomes it aims to produce. Without this autonomy, the participating actors will tend to lose their incentive and motivation to participate in joint problem-solving. Governance theorists list a number of ways in which public authorities can metagovern governance networks. The tools of metagovernance can be divided into four main categories: (a) political, discursive, and financial framing that aims to define the basic task of the network and the conditions for solving it by defining the overall objectives, crafting a particular narrative, or encouraging governance networks to pursue particular strategies through the allocation of financial resources and other privileges; (b) institutional design that aims to create formal or informal arenas for interaction between a particular group of actors and define the basic rules of engagement; (c) network facilitation that aims to support and nurture a constructive management of difference through different kinds of process management by lowering the transaction costs of interacting, mediating conflicts, and supporting mutual learning processes; and (d) network participation that aims to influence the joint production of outputs and outcomes by aligning the goals of the actors and defining decision-making criteria.

These four metagovernance tools should be viewed as complementary rather than as mutually exclusive. Hands-off forms of metagovernance via framing and design of networks can benefit from hands-on metagovernance through facilitation of and participation in networks. By the same token, hands-on forms of metagovernance rarely function well if they are not underpinned by hands-off forms of governance. The metagovernance of governance networks is a complex and difficult endeavor that can easily go awry. The key challenge for metagovernors is to avoid regulating the governance networks too much or too little (Sorensen & Torfing, 2009). If, on one hand, governance networks are metagoverned too tightly, the network actors lose their motivation to participate in self-regulated interaction. On the other hand, too little or too weak metagovernance can result in a destructive discrepancy between the strategy pursued by the governance network and the goals pursued by public authorities. Whether or not governance networks become a positive governance tool depends, to a large extent, on to what extent metagovernors find the right level of interference in the governance network. It also depends, as we will argue, on whether the chosen metagovernance strategy fits the purpose assigned to the governance network.

### 1NC — AT: Ontology

#### Ontology is wrong and zaps activist energy — turns the aff

Susen, 19—Reader in Sociology at the School of Arts and Social Sciences of City, University of London (Simon, “No escape from the technosystem?,” Philosophy & Social Criticism, October 9, 2019, dml)

A major irony of Feenberg’s book is the following contradiction: on several occasions, he criticizes, and distances himself from, technological determinism; key parts of his argument suggest, however, that he himself flirts with, if not subscribes to, technological determinism. He rightly maintains, and convincingly demonstrates, that ‘society and technology are inextricably imbricated’.240 This insight justifies the underlying assumption that there is no comprehensive study of society without a critical sociology of technology. Yet, to contend that ‘[s]ocial groups exist through the technologies that bind their members together’241 is misleading. For not all social groups are primarily defined by the technologies that enable their members to relate to, and to bond with, one another. Indeed, not all social relations, or social bonds, are based on, let alone determined by, technology.

Of course, Feenberg is right to argue that ‘technologically mediated groups influence technical design through their choices and protests’.242 Ultimately, though, the previous assertion is tautological. This becomes clear if, in the above sentence, we replace the word ‘technological(ly)’ with terms such as ‘cultural(ly)’, ‘linguistical(ly)’, ‘political(ly)’, ‘economic(ally)’, or indeed another sociological qualifier commonly used to characterize the specificity of a social relation. Hence, we may declare that ‘culturally, linguistically, politically, and economically mediated groups influence cultural, linguistic, political, and economic conventions through their choices and protests’. In saying so, we are stating the obvious. If, however, we aim to make a case for cultural, linguistic, political, or economic determinism, then this is problematic to the extent that we end up reducing the constitution of social arrangements to the product of one overriding causal set of forces (whether these be cultural, linguistic, political, economic, technological, or otherwise).

While declaring that he is a critic of technological determinism, Feenberg – in central passages of his book – gives the impression that he is one of its fiercest advocates. Feenberg’s techno-Marxist evolutionism is based on the premise that ‘progress is realized essentially through technosystem change’243 – that is, on the assumption that, effectively, human progress is reducible to technological development. Feenberg is right to stress that ‘[t]echnical progress is joined indissolubly to the democratic enlargement of access to its benefits and protection from its harms’.244 ‘Concretization’,245 understood in this way, conceives of progress as a ‘local, context-bound phenomenon uniting technical and normative dimensions’.246 We may add, however, that progress has not only technical (or technological) but also economic, cultural, and political dimensions, which contain objective, normative, and subjective facets. At times, the differentiation between these aspects is blurred, if not lost, in Feenberg’s account, given his tendency to overstate the power of technology at the expense of other crucial social forces. In other words, progress is not only ‘inextricably entangled with the technosystem’,247 but it is also indissolubly entwined with the economic, cultural, and political systems in which it unfolds and for (or against) which it exerts its objective, normative, and subjective power.

The preceding reflection takes us back to the problem of techno-reductionism:

The struggle over the technosystem began with the labor movement. Workers’ demands for health and safety on the job were public interventions into production technology.248

All struggles over social (sub)systems have not only a technological but also various other (notably economic, cultural, and political) dimensions. Demands made by particular subjects (defined by class, ethnicity, gender, age, or ability – or a combination of these sociological variables) are commonly expressed in public interventions not only into production technology, but also into economic, cultural, and political systems. In all social struggles (including class struggle), technology can be an important means to an end, but it is rarely an end in itself. Put differently, social struggles are partly – but seldom essentially, let alone exclusively – about technology.

#### If they win ontology then the aff inevitably fails because it engages in the Zoomification of debate for an attempt of positive ends that they say is physically impossible.

### 1NC — Solvency

#### The aff’s strategy is impossible and cedes power to unaccountable elites

David Chandler 07, Westminster IR professor, “Deconstructing Sovereignty: Constructing Global Civil Society,” in Politics Without Sovereignty: A Critique of Contemporary International Relations, pg 164-5

Global civil society theorists focus their ire on what they understand to be the narrow, exclusionary bias of the sovereign state. In turn, they view a wide constellation of transnational actors, from the global mega-NGOs to local farming cooperatives, as representing a radical alternative that opens up the space for new kinds of political organization and activity. In fact, what the celebration of ‘bottom-up’ politics and the critique of the state really express is a deep disenchantment with mass society and the demands of formal accountability that go along with representative democracy.72 A consequence of rejecting the political sphere is that it leaves political struggles isolated from any shared framework of meaning or from any formal processes of democratic accountability. The quest for individual autonomy and the claim for the recognition of separate ‘political spaces’ and the ‘incommunicability’ of political causes, each demonstrate the limits of these radical claims for the normative project of global civil society [END PAGE 164] ‘from below’. Far from reflecting the emergence of new global political forces, the global civil society, by virtue of its social isolation, is marked by political weakness. As such, the only strategy left to it is a retreat into elite lobbying and individualized ethical postures. It is important to stress that I am not claiming that the key problem with radical global civil society approaches is their rejection of formal engagement per se in existing political institutions and established parties. The point I am making here is that the rejection of state-based politics, which forces the individual to engage with and account for the views of other members of society, reflects a deeper problem – an unwillingness to engage in political contestation per se. Proponents of global civil society ‘from below’ therefore seek to legitimize their views as the prior moral claims of others. This has the effect of transforming global civic actors into the advocates of those unable to make moral claims themselves. Alternatively, they put themselves in harm’s way and would lead by inarticulate example. What they avoid doing is pursuing their own interests or seeking to build political solidarity around shared interests. What can actually be achieved through their chosen methods is limited. Radical lobbying and calls for recognition may in some cases precipitate a generational turnover in the establishment. However, the rejection of social engagement is more likely to lead to a further shrinking of the political sphere, reducing it to a small circle of increasingly unaccountable elites. If the only alternative to the political ‘game’ is to threaten to ‘take our ball home’ – the anti-politics of rejectionism – the powers that be can sleep peacefully in their beds.

#### The aff’s strategy of resistance is grounded in the logic of cybernetic networks

Ulises Ali Mejias 13. Assistant Professor of Communication Studies @ the State University of New York, College at Oswego. June 2013. “THE NETWORK AS METHOD FOR ORGANIZING THE WORLD.“ Chapter 1 in *Off the Network: Disrupting the Digital World*. pp 12-13. JSTOR. pacc [brackets denote edits clarification for readability]

The articulation of nodocentrism and the kinds of inequalities it produces might suggest that the normative goal of unmapping the digital network is to give shape to a noncapitalist information society. However, information, sociality, and capital are entangled today in such a way that to suggest an easy separation would be simply naive. Furthermore, the spaces of resistance that digital networks have currently opened up, no matter how circumscribed by corporate interests, are important and should not be dismantled just yet. Therefore, it seems prudent at this point to clarify some things about a book that—going by its title alone—appears to issue a call to arms against digital networks. This book will not be arguing that the existence of the digital network, in and of itself, has negative consequences for humanity (I believe that as the designers and users of digital networks, we—not they—are ultimately responsible for what kind of impact [the network has] they have on our society). Furthermore, the book will not be calling on anyone to stop using digital networks or providing step-by-step instructions for dismantling any kind of digital network. The point is not to embark on a journey to some remote corner of our contemporary life to find subjectivities or sites untouched by digital networks. Thus this book will not be promoting a network Luddism, because no responsible person can afford to be a Luddite. In a world where 1.6 million cell phones are activated every day, inclusion and exclusion from the network are everywhere— embodied not only by the digital divide that separates the haves from the have-nots but also by the digital divides that privilege some socio-cognitive spaces and undermine others, or the interior digital divides that separate our networked from our nonnetworked selves. Instead of romanticizing some prenetworked state of being, this book will try to get us to confront the tensions in those digital divides, because the spaces on the "wrong" side of the divide—those not based on the predictable and controllable models prescribed by network logic—will increasingly be considered threats to the network.

So while we need to be critical of the use of digital networks as platforms for participation, I am not calling for a total rejection of the network as a model for organizing sociality or the dismantling of for-profit networks wherever they may be found. Rather, I believe that a reimagining of identity beyond the templates of the network episteme is necessary to articulate new models of participation, and that is what I mean by doing the work of "disrupting" the digital world: unsettling, undermining, and even unmapping what is oppressive in certain structures of thought. This book strives to present a starting point for this kind of unthinking. While some general strategies will be discussed, they will not be presented as subversive tasks intended exclusively for hackers, anarchists, or dissenters. To the extent that we each participate in digital networks, we are all already engaged in the production of inequality, and we are all also involved in the politics of inclusion and exclusion of the network. Furthermore, no one enjoys absolute inclusion, so we are always already occupying varying states of exclusion. Embodying the organizing logic of the network is part of what we already do, perhaps without even realizing it, and it is the divide between the networked and nonnetworked parts of our identity (the included and excluded parts) that we have to become sensitive to.

While using networks to disrupt networks might make strategic sense at times (what Hardt and Negri call fighting networks with networks16), the goal of this work is to theorize models that ultimately move beyond network logic altogether. Disrupting the digital network cannot rely only on marginal strategies such as hacking, open-source/open-content paradigms, peer-to-peer sharing, and so on because these strategies rely on the same logic the network does, as I shall argue in later chapters. The challenge is to acknowledge the fact that, since the network is agnostic about what it assimilates and can thus easily extend its reach, there is "no longer a place that can be recognized as outside."17 This makes the task of being against the network increasingly difficult, since in order to be against one needs to occupy a position or framework outside the established paradigm. To Hardt and Negri, this simply means that we must be against everywhere—inside and at the same time outside the network (and since every node has limits or borders, the outside is not just what is external to the network but what lies internally between nodes). But if nothing is really outside the logic of the network, how can we begin to articulate the ethical and political meaning of being against the network? The greatest obstacle today to the emergence of a critical theory of the network episteme is, therefore, our inability to imagine an outside.

### 1NC — Turn

#### Turn---algorithmic governance combats human racial biases

Zerilli 18, Professor of law and philosophy at the University of Sydney, with; Alistair Knott, James Maclaurin, and Colin Gavaghan (John, “Transparency in Algorithmic and Human Decision-Making: Is There a Double Standard?,” <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13347-018-0330-6#Sec4>)

Human bias is often intrinsic, in the above sense, because it bears an important relation to emotion, itself a constitutive feature of personality (Angie et al. 2011; Pohl 2008; Stephan and Finlay 1999). Racial bias is a good example of intrinsic bias in human beings, because the connection with emotion is relatively clear (the emotion being fear), as is its tolerance to falsifying evidence. When someone has been conditioned to believe that an ethnic minority poses a threat to safety, or is more susceptible to crime, merely supplying that person with evidence to the contrary may be insufficient to dislodge a lifetime of encrusted prejudice (Bezrukova et al. 2016). Racist conditioning may permanently (or semipermanently) affect the way a person processes information and makes decisions. Of course this is not to say that intrinsic bias is always irrational. Many human biases could be thought to result from the misfiring of an ancient and conserved cognitive adaptation to make generic judgements (Begby 2013; Leslie 2017). Because such judgements are based on dispositional rather than probabilistic factors, they too tend to be resistant to disconfirming evidence.

As against intrinsic bias, bias that is not intrinsic (i.e. extrinsic) derives from a system’s inputs when they do not effect a permanent change in the system’s internal structure and rules of operation. In these cases, false information may affect a system’s outputs, but so long as the information is corrected, the outputs will be unbiased pro tanto. Thus, if a person is given information that leads them to the erroneous belief that p, and the belief that p plays a relevant role in decision-making, leading to the decision that q, the person will be nonintrinsically biased towards the decision that q if, upon receiving the correct information, the person no longer believes that p, and either abandons or revises the grounds for the decision that q.

Overall, while it is true that an algorithm can be intrinsically biased (see below), nonintrinsic bias is probably the bigger issue for AI (Friedman and Nissenbaum 1996; Johnson 2006). The so-called dirty data problem is a neat illustration. Errors and biases latent in data training sets tend to be reproduced in the outputs of machine learning tools (Barocas and Selbst 2015; Diakopoulos 2015). This is a significant problem, and one that is compounded—of all things—by copyright and intellectual property laws, which presently limit the access users have to better quality training data (Levendowski 2017).Footnote9 But nonintrinsic bias is still in principle less difficult to overcome than intrinsic bias. Most of these problems arise from the use of unrepresentative data sets. For instance, face recognition systems trained predominantly on Caucasian faces might reject the passport application photos of Asian persons, whose eyes appear closed (Griffiths 2016). Speech recognition systems, too, are notorious for being less accurate when decoding female voices than male ones (Tatman 2016). Both situations arise from a failure to include members of diverse social groups in training data. The obvious solution is to diversify the training sets (Klingele 2016; Crawford and Calo 2016). While there are political and legal barriers in the way of this, as Levendowski (2017) documents in her careful analysis of intellectual property laws, it is not nearly as intractable a problem as the one posed by intrinsic human bias (Bezrukova et al. 2016; Plous 2003a; Allport 1954).

### 1NC — Sustainable

#### Have a high threshold for their unsustainability and information arguments — our brains are wired for techno-pessimism — digital synchronicity solves every impact in the 1AC

Rinehart 18 (Will Rinehart is Director of Technology and Innovation Policy at the American Action Forum, where he specializes in telecommunication, Internet, and data policy, with a focus on emerging technologies and innovation. Rinehart previously worked at TechFreedom, where he was a Research Fellow. He was also previously the Director of Operations at the International Center for Law & Economics. In Defense of Techno-optimism. 10-10-2018. <https://techliberation.com/2018/10/10/in-defense-of-techno-optimism/> //shree)

Many are understandably pessimistic about platforms and technology. This year has been a tough one, from Cambridge Analytica and Russian trolls to the implementation of GDPR and data breaches galore. Those who think about the world, about the problems that we see every day, and about their own place in it, will quickly realize the immense frailty of humankind. Fear and worry makes sense. We are flawed, each one of us. And technology only seems to exacerbate those problems. But life is getting better. Poverty continues nose-diving; adult literacy is at an all-time high; people around the world are living longer, living in democracies, and are better educated than at any other time in history. Meanwhile, the digital revolution has resulted in a glut of informational abundance, helping to correct the informational asymmetries that have long plagued humankind. The problem we now face is not how to address informational constraints, but how to provide the means for people to sort through and make sense of this abundant trove of data. These macro trends don’t make headlines. Psychologists know that people love to read negative articles. Our brains are wired for pessimism. In the shadow of a year of bad news, it helpful to remember that Facebook and Google and Reddit and Twitter also support humane conversations. Most people aren’t going online to talk about politics and if you are, then you are rare. These sites are places where families and friends can connect. They offer a space of solace – like when chronic pain sufferers find others on Facebook, or when widows vent, rage, laugh and cry without judgement through the Hot Young Widows Club. Let’s also not forget that Reddit, while sometimes a place of rage and spite, is also where a weight lifter with cerebral palsy can become a hero and where those with addiction can find healing. And in the hardest to reach places in Canada, in Iqaluit, people say that “Amazon Prime has done more toward elevating the standard of living of my family than any territorial or federal program. Full stop. Period” Three-fourths of Americans say major technology companies’ products and services have been more good than bad for them personally. But when it comes to the whole of society, they are more skeptical about technology bringing benefits. Here is how I read that disparity: Most of us think that we have benefited from technology, but we worry about where it is taking the human collective. That is an understandable worry, but one that shouldn’t hobble us to inaction. Nor is technology making us stupid. Indeed, quite the opposite is happening. Technology use in those aged 50 and above seems to have caused them to be cognitively younger than their parents to the tune of 4 to 8 years. While the use of Google does seem to reduce our ability to recall information, studies find that it has boosted other kinds of memory, like retrieving information. Why remember a fact when you can remember where it is located? Concerned how audiobooks might be affecting people, Beth Rogowsky, an associate professor of education, compared them to physical reading and was surprised to find “no significant differences in comprehension between reading, listening, or reading and listening simultaneously.” Cyberbullying and excessive use might make parents worry, but NIH supported work found that “Heavy use of the Internet and video gaming may be more a symptom of mental health problems than a cause. Moderate use of the Internet, especially for acquiring information, is most supportive of healthy development.” Don’t worry. The kids are going to be alright. And yes, there is a lot we still need to fix. There is cruelty, racism, sexism, and poverty of all kinds embedded in our technological systems. But the best way to handle these issues is through the application of human ingenuity

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. Human ingenuity begets technology in all of its varieties. When Scott Alexander over at Star Slate Codex recently looked at 52 startups being groomed by startup incubator Y Combinator, he rightly pointed out that many of them were working for the betterment of all: Thirteen of them had an altruistic or international development focus, including Neema, an app to help poor people without access to banks gain financial services; Kangpe, online health services for people in Africa without access to doctors; Credy, a peer-to-peer lending service in India; Clear Genetics, an automated genetic counseling tool for at-risk parents; and Dost Education, helping to teach literacy skills in India via a $1/month course. Twelve of them seemed like really exciting cutting-edge technology, including CBAS, which describes itself as “human bionics plug-and-play”; Solugen, which has a way to manufacture hydrogen peroxide from plant sugars; AON3D, which makes 3D printers for industrial uses; Indee, a new genetic engineering system; Alem Health, applying AI to radiology, and of course the obligatory drone delivery startup. Eighteen of them seemed like boring meat-and-potatoes companies aimed at businesses that need enterprise data solution software application package analytics targeting management something something something “the cloud”. As for the other companies, they were the kind of niche products that Silicon Valley has come to be criticized for supporting. Perhaps the Valley deserves some criticism, but perhaps it deserves more credit than it’s been receiving as-of-late. Contemporary tech criticism displays a kind of anti-nostalgia. Instead of being reverent for the past, anxiety for the future abounds. In these visions, the future is imagined as a strange, foreign land, beset with problems. And yet, to quote that old adage, tomorrow is the visitor that is always coming but never arrives. The future never arrives because we are assembling it today. We need to work diligently together to piece together a better world. But if we constantly live in fear of what comes next, that future won’t be built. Optimism needn’t be pollyannaish. It only needs to be hopeful of a better world.

# 2NC

## Framework

# 1NR

## Case

### 1NR — AT: Hacking

#### Those overwhelm and turn alt solvency.

**DeBoer ’16** [Fredrik; March 15th; Ph.D. from Purdue University; Fredrikdeboer, “c’mon, guys,” http://fredrikdeboer.com/2016/03/15/cmon-guys/; GR]

I could be wrong about the short-term dangers, and the stakes are incredibly high. But in the end we’re left with the same old question: what tactics will actually work to secure a better world?

In a sharp, sober piece about the meaning of left-wing political violence in the 1970s, Tim Barker writes “If you can’t acknowledge radical violence, radicals are reduced to mere victims of repression, rather than political actors who made definite tactical choices under given political circumstances.” The problem, as Barker goes on to imply, is those tactical choices: in today’s America they will essentially never break on the side of armed opposition against the state. The government knows everything about you, I’m sorry to say, your movements and your associations and the books you read and the things you buy and what you’re saying to the people you communicate with. That’s simply on the level of information before we even get to the state’s incredible capacity to inflict violence.

Look, the world has changed. The relative military capacity of regular people compared to establishment governments has changed, especially in fully developed, technology-enabled countries like the United States. The Czar had his armies, yes, but the Czar’s armies depended on manpower above and beyond everything else. The fighting was still mostly different groups of people with rifles shooting at each other. If tomorrow you could rally as many people as the Bolsheviks had at their revolutionary peak, you’re still left in a world of F-15s, drones, and cluster bombs. And that’s to say nothing of the fact that establishment governments in the developed world can rely on the numbing agents of capitalist luxuries and the American dream to damper revolutionary enthusiasm even among the many millions who have been marginalized and impoverished. This just isn’t 1950s Cuba, guys. It’s just not. In a very real way, modern technology effectively lowers the odds of armed political revolution in a country like the United States to zero, and so much the worse for us.

This isn’t fatalism. It doesn’t mean there’s no hope. It means that there is little alternative to organization, to changing minds through committed political action and using the available nonviolent means to create change: a concert of grassroots organizing, labor tactics, and partisan politics. Those things aren’t exactly likely to work, either, but they’re a hell of a lot more plausible than us dweebs taking the Pentagon. Bernie Sanders isn’t really a socialist, but he’s a social democrat that moves the conversation to the left, and if people are dedicated and committed to organizing, the local, state, and national candidates he inspires will move it further to the left still. You got any better suggestions?

Listen, commie nerds. My people. I love you guys. I really do. And I want to build a better world. Not incrementally, either, but with the kind of sweeping and transformative change that is required to fix a world of such deep injustice. But seriously: none of us are ever going to take to the barricades. And it’s a good thing, too, because we’d probably find a way to shoot in the wrong direction. I can’t dribble a basketball without falling down. American socialism is largely made up of bookish dreamers. I love those people but they’re not for fighting. And even if you have a particular talent for combat, you’re looking at fighting the combined forces of Google, Goldman Sachs, and the defense industry. Violence is hard. Soldiering is hard. In an era of the NSA and military robots, it’s really, really hard. “Should we condone revolutionary violence?” is dorm room, pass-the-bong conversation fodder, of precisely the moral and intellectual weight of “should we torture a guy if we know there’s a bomb and we know he knows where it is and we know we can stop it if we do?” It’s built on absurd hypotheticals, propped up by the power of anxious machismo, and undertaken to no practical political end. It’s understandable. I get it, I really do. But it’s got nothing to do with us. The only way forward is the grubby, unsexy work of building coalitions and asking people to climb on board.